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Beyond the Pale 
 
Figure 1: Mumbai police stand proudly by piles of water booster pumps removed 
from informal settlements in the Shivaji Nagar and Govandi districts of the City the 
previous night 
The Mumbai Mirror, Friday, 8th January 2010.1 A photograph (Figure 1) shows a line 
up of proud Mumbai police officers standing behind row upon row of what appear at 
first sight to be rusted machine guns. But this is not one of the arms caches regularly 
unearthed to demonstrate the Force’s acuity against the myriad of terrorist networks 
that regularly target urban sites in contemporary India. The objects, rather, are water 
booster pumps, ripped from ground in Mumbai slums in a new campaign of dawn 
raids against ‘illegal’ water theft within the City’s burgeoning informal settlements in 
the City’s Shivaji Nagar and Govandi districts (see map). 
“STEALING WATER TO EARN A FEW BUCKS?” screams the article’s headline. 
“PAY A HEFTY PRICE!”  It details how the raids are being backed up by new legal 
moves to criminalise people ‘stealing’ water. Hundreds of people, arrested for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Abhijit Sathe, ‘Stealing water to earn a few bucks? Pay a hefty price,’ Mumbai Mirror, 
Friday 8, January, 2010, p. 4. 
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installing and using the pumps, are to be prosecuted under draconian and non-
bailable laws such as the ‘Damages to Public Property Act.’ All this is portrayed 
unproblematically as a heroic response to the threat that water theft by slum dwellers 
poses to the wider, formal, legitimate and law-abiding City. “Pilferages, if not 
controlled,” writes the author, Abhijit Sathe, “could exhaust the potable water 
reserves before the next [summer] monsoon.”2 
Such statements tap into a mainstream discourse where poor recent monsoons have 
led to a major “water crisis” in Mumbai which necessitates radical, emergency 
measures to address widespread “water theft” or “water pilferage” -- especially by 
the urban poor. What such discourses occlude, however, are the ways in which 
current systems of urban water provision work to systematically dehydrate or derive 
massive profits from urban slum communities whilst water wastage by affluent elites 
and their preferred urban facilities remains gargantuan. 
On a rapidly urbanizing and increasingly thirsty planet, contemporary Mumbai is 
harbinger of a stark global future. The majority of humans, already, are urbanites; 
75% will be by 2050, The inevitable result is that water, like everything else, is being 
urbanised: larger and larger swathes of the earth’s ‘natural’ hydrological systems are 
being orchestrated to sustain of burgeoning metropolitan areas.3 This transformation 
blurs easy separation of nature and the city that is a legacy of modernist thinking, as 
the earth’s water is increasingly metabolized through the pipes, channels and sewers 
of urban areas (and, of course, the bodies of the people that live in them).  
With urban residents largely unable to provide for their own water needs, access to 
technological systems providing water of adequate quality and quantity is now 
arguably the most basic element of the right to a decent and dignified urban life. This 
is especially so for the world’s billion or more slum dwellers usually systematically 
denied access to formal water supplies because of their claims of space in cities is 
deemed illegitimate or illegal. For such communities, the challenge of even very 
basic hydration, sanitation or washing often involves the negotiation of complex 
circuits of predation, corruption and patronage, arrangements which seek to fully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 ibid. 
3 See Erik Swyndegouw, Social Power and the Urbanization of Water: Flows of Power, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2004); Maria Kaika, City of Flows: Modernity, Nature and 
the City, London: Routledge (2005).  
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exploit both the nature of urban water as the ultimate, inelastic, life-giving 
commodity, and the distance of such communities from adequate formal water 
infrastructures.   
Crucially, slums and slum dwellers are often demonized and criminalised to such an 
extent in Global South megacities that they are often portrayed not to be actually of 
‘the city’ at all. Another Mumbai Mirror article, for example, published three days 
later,4 recounts the systematic destruction of another network of ‘illegal’ pipes 
improvised by slum dwellers in the Dahisar district, 12 miles to the North West of 
Shivaji Nagar and Govandi.  Here a punitive act of state violence against one of the 
poorest and most vulnerable communities in Mumbai, undertaken after protracted 
lobbying by nearby affluent communities, is sanitised as a heroic act of water 
conservation “saving water” for “the city.”  
Here ‘the city’ signifies, crucially, not the whole of Mumbai but the formal city of 
apartment blocks, malls, corporate towers, technology centres and leisure parks 
organised to meet the needs of elites, middle classes, foreign investors and tourists. 
All else – the majority of the population living in self-built slums on a mere twentieth 
of the City’s land  – is in the process cast out from the modern rights, entitlements 
and promises of city life. Worse still, they are rendered instead as a parasitic threat 
requiring increasingly violent response and draconian control. Given the most 
essential nature of urban water, Georgio Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life’5 -- human 
existence reduced to a biological process, that can be extinguished through 
sovereign power with impunity – has rarely seen so apposite. 
In the essay that follows, we seek to excavate further the complex politics of water in 
contemporary Mumbai6. We demonstrate in particular how the contemporary 
situation in Mumbai demonstrates the costs of such processes of casting out the 
majority urban poor in the megacities of the world: in public health, death-rates and 
communicable and water-borne diseases; in the burden of waiting for and carrying 
water (especially for women and children); in the burden of incurring high 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Virat A. Singh, ‘How the BMC saved the city 4 lakh litres of water,’ Mumbai Mirror, Monday 
11th January, 2010, pp. 8. 
5 Georgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University 
Press, 1998. 
6 We gratefully acknowledge the support of the ESRC for the grant ‘Everyday Sanitation, 
number RES/0360/7277, which made this research possible. 
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expenditure on water; in water extortion against the poor by predatory mafia-style 
rackets; and in the miseries of systematic dehydration. Here, we also draw upon our 
research in Rafinagar, an unrecognized and still-expanding informal settlement of 
around 20,000 residents, situated within the larger Shivaji Nagar district.  
Beyond this, we also reveal how these costs are systematically obfuscated within 
dominant discourses of the urban water crisis emanating from governing elites, 
security and police forces and mainstream media. In Mumbai these work, as we shall 
see, to demonise informal settlements and their residents as the ultimate cause of 
the wider water crisis afflicting the City. They also work to portray informal 
settlements and their inhabitants as contagions to be violently cleansed en route to 
the reclaiming and reconstruction of Mumbai as a new ‘global city’ to rival Shanghai.  
Finally, such mainstream discourses, whilst acknowledging the complicity of the 
state in perpetuating “water theft” and mafia-style water extortion, portray this as 
inhibiting adequate access to municipal water by “tax-paying citizens” rather than as 
perpetuating the perilous position of Mumbai’s poor citizens in terms of water 
access. In the process, the exploitative power relations linking the police, 
Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (the City’s municipal Government), and 
informal settlements are rendered all but invisible.  
Parched City 
In 2008, some 19.5 million people were squeezed into the 438 square kilometers of 
Mumbai’s tiny island-peninsular and its immediate hinterland (Figure 2). The city was 
thus the fifth biggest in the world by population, it’s population having quadrupled in 
a mere four decades.  
Dominating this growth overwhelmingly has been Mumbai’s burgeoning population of 
people living in informal settlements. Indeed, one estimate suggests that, whilst in 
1861 only 12% of Mumbai’s population could be classified as ‘poor,’ by 1991 this 
figure had risen to 51%.7  (Such definitions are contested, however, and are 
complicated by the fact that Mumbai’s extremely high real estate prices force many 
lower middle class people to live in informal settlements).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Sunil Kumar, Shigeo Shikura and Hideki Harada, ‘Living environment and health of urban 
poor: A study of Mumbai,’ Economic and Political Weekly, August 23, 2003, 3575-3586.  
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Figure 2: The city of Mumbai, 2011, showing municipal wards and the main 
Zopadpatti  or ‘slum’ areas mentioned in the text
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Mumbai has an increasingly fragmented and polarized metropolitan landscape.8 The 
World Bank estimates that 54% of Mumbai’s population – around 9 million people – 
are now concentrated into the City’s extraordinary archipelago of super-dense 
informal settlements or Zopadpatti, forced to occupy just the 5% of the City’s more 
marginal land where they can gain a foothold (Figure 2).9 Such places have amongst 
the highest population densities on Earth: the biggest, Dharavi, famously, squeezes 
over a million people into just one square mile. Mumbai’s slum-dwellers are clearly 
the city’s most vulnerable population: they are the prime victims of environmental 
pollution, a whole spectrum of water-borne and other diseases, and suffer 
inadequate housing conditions, infrastructure services, and waste disposal routes.  
Within 30 years, moreover, all projections suggest that Mumbai’s extraordinary rate 
of continued growth will lead it to become the world’s second largest city (after 
Tokyo), with over 26 million people. The vast majority of this new population is 
expected to squeeze into the parched, hyper-dense, informal cities. 
Mumbai’s polarized social landscape is starkly reflected in the politics of water 
provision in a city which, despite having copious monsoon rains, has never been 
able to provide decent, piped water for all. Instead, Mumbai’s water politics are 
labrynthine in their complexity. A complex colonial and planning legacy of half-built 
improvements laces a very shaky and partial piped system. Based on a crumbling, 
century-old system of highly fragile pipes, Mumbai’s water system is already at crisis 
point. Meanwhile, ongoing efforts to build new reservoirs far to the North of the City 
have faced severe delays and funding shortages and have so far failed to increase 
supply to match Mumbai’s burgeoning population. Such a situation has been 
compounded by a series of failed monsoons as well by continuously high levels of  
water leakage and regular pipe ruptures. All this means that whilst Mumbai, with a 
notional per capita water availability of 180 litres, is theoretically endowed with more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Matthew Gandy, “Landscapes of disaster: water, modernity, and urban fragmentation 
in Mumbai,” Environment and Planning A, 40, 108-130, 2008. 
9 World Bank, ‘Bombay fights the markets, and more than half of Mumbai’s residents live in 
slums’, World Bank.Org, 2009 at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/HOMEPORTUGUESE/EXTMAININPOR/EXT
DATAANDRESINPOR/EXTRESINPOR/EXTWDRINPOR/EXTWDR2009INPOR/0,,contentM
DK:21954976~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:5593535,00.html 
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water per person than London, which has 150 litres, it fails even to offer its most 
affluent citizens 24 hour piped water services.10 
Mumbai currently receives about 2,500 million litres of water per day from the 
jungles, lakes and mountains in the north of the Maharashtra state within which 
Mumbai falls. This has been estimated to represent only around 65% of demand.11 
In 2009, this deficit led the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC), the City’s 
municipal government, to limit the hours of water supply to all users in the city.  
Mumbai’s water crisis means that even many wealthy residencies are now supplied 
with piped water for only two or three hours a day. Around 20% of all the City’s piped 
water escapes into the ground through leaks. Another 20% or so is tapped illegally 
by water tanker providers, construction industry, or informal and formal settlements. 
Periodic ruptures in the mains supply add to the sense of a pivotal urban resources 
being wasted before reaching its rightful users. Complete bans and rationed quotas 
are regularly introduced during relatively dry monsoon seasons.  
The presence of the burgeoning Zopadpatti  -- informal settlements -- dominates 
Mumbai’s water politics. Many such places have, for generations, been 
systematically denied adequate linkages to formal, piped water supplies, and are 
thus the most vulnerable to the current water crisis. The BMC offers inhabitants of 
informal settlements water connections with a daily notional amount of 45 litres per 
person per day, a mere 30% of that allocated to a resident living in formal residential 
areas (135 litres per person per day). But even these often fail to materialize. Such 
places rely on a myriad of unmetered municipal stand posts, metered municipal 
group connections, personal wells, boreholes, tanks, tankers, filtration systems and 
improvised pipes, as well as many other efforts to seek water of adequate quality 
and quantity. A baroque world of organised crime, meanwhile, which overlaps with 
the world of public and water officials, works to exploit extraordinary profits from 
illegal piped supplies and water tanker deliveries, focusing especially on the poorest 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Lisa Bjorkman, Water and Resettlement on the Urban Periphery: the case of Mumbai’s M-
East Ward, Unpublished paper, page 1. 
11 Narendra Jadhav, “Economic Renewal of Mumbai City: Opportunities and Constraints,” 
Paper presented at the International Conference on Urban Renewal: Learning for Mumbai, 
Mumbai, May 24-26, 2005 at 
http://www.drnarendrajadhav.info/drnjadhav_web_files/Published%20papers/Economic%20
REnewal%20of%20Mumabai%20City.pdf 
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slums who are so distanced from alternatives. They also systematically work to delay 
efforts to extend piped water to slum communities. 
It is startling that recent visions to plan and improve Mumbai don’t even attempt to 
universalize decent water for the city. Instead they merely disguise or camouflage 
these huge problems. Strategies like Vision Mumbai, commissioned by the elite 
citizens’ group Bombay First from the McKinsey management consultants in 2003,12 
and since adopted by the Maharashtra State Government, seek, instead, to 
superficially ‘clean up’ or ‘re-brand’ Mumbai, improving quality of life and services for 
affluent respectable citizens. The theory goes that such changes will lead Mumbai to 
imitate the success of Shanghai or Singapore as ‘global cities.’ The result is an 
increasingly authoritarian stance – including mass demolitions (particularly intensive 
in the winter of 2004-5), declarations that newer slums will not receive any water 
service, and efforts to remove the poor from public spaces -- against Mumbai’s slum 
dwellers.  
As Matthew Gandy points out,13 this embourgeoisement of public policy has been 
fed by an increasingly moralistic discourse amongst Mumbai’s media and public 
institutions. This tends to demonise the poor as illegitimate imposters within Mumbai 
and so legitimize increasingly authoritarian and punitive policies against them. It 
therefore works to weaken the already feeble concepts of civil society, citizenship 
and human rights within the City. In the context of water, such bourgeois 
environmentalist14 policies have been made possible because the water-borne 
diseases that increasingly afflict slum dwellers – Surat plague, malaria – tend not to 
directly endanger Mumbai’s middle class residents. 
Mumbai’s water crisis means that water protests increasingly convulse the city; water 
scarcity increasingly dominates political mobilisation and debate; new legal sanctions 
are mobilised against transgressions to cope with the new sense of emergency. In 
addition, water engineers are regularly attacked; political parties mobilise their loyal 
mobs on water demonstration against water engineering departments and officials; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Maharashtra state Government (2003) Vision Mumbai: Transforming Mumbai into a 
World-Class City, at http://www.maharashtra.gov.in/english/reports/taskforce.pdf 
13 See Matthew Gandy, “Landscapes of disaster”, pp. 122. 
14 See Amita Baviskar, ‘The politics of the city’, Seminar 156, 2002, available at 
http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/516/516%20amita%20baviskar.htm 
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local groups have beaten beat up neighbours accused of locking collective taps, 
parading them around streets with their hair shorn in humiliation. “The city’s water 
crisis,” warned the Mumbai Mirror in December 2009 at the height of a particularly 
acute shortage, “seems to be turning Mumbaikars into monsters.”15 
This politics of water scarcity and the systematic denial of water to the poor is quickly 
translating, through a classic process of securitisation, into a militarised struggle to 
control and protect Mumbai’s water supplies. Thus the status quo of effective 
hydrological apartheid, forged through lesser water entitlements for residents of 
informal settlements as well as mafia-style predation on them is sustained rather 
than undermined or overturned.  
As we seek to detail in this essay, this is being done through a campaign to blame 
and criminalise Zopadpatti dwellers, and their efforts to gain even minimal access to 
water, for the City’s water crisis as a justification to ‘take back’ or ‘reclaim’ the city’s 
water for elite and middle class ‘tax payers’ and real estate interests. Such a 
campaign is a powerful form of obfuscation which works to obscure the origins of the 
current water crisis and deny the apartheid geographies of supply which 
systematically starve the majority of the urban poor of water. 
Water wars 
As with the Mumbai Mirror articles detailed above, the official discourse surrounding 
Mumbai’s water crisis offers a simple tale of a malign and burgeoning informal 
population threatening the order, security and public health of the formal city of 
legitimate, tax-paying citizens through their profligate and criminal theft of water.  
One report by the Mumbai High Court, published in July, 2009, critical of the BMC, 
stipulates that the number of encroachments on the mains pipelines in Mumbai has 
grown from 6,687 in 1995 to 15,780 in 2009.16 It sees these ‘encroachments’ as a 
“health and security hazard” which can “puncture the entire system” -- what they 
term “the real lifeline of the city.”17  
A powerful revanchist logic is at play here: if only ‘we’ – i.e. middle class and elite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Yogesh Sadhwani, ‘Water war!’, Mumbai Mirror, November 17th, 2010, p. 2. 
16 Hetal Vyas, “HC pulls up BMC over state of water pipelines,” Mumbai Mirror, July 30, 
2009. 
17 ibid. 
Water wars in Mumbai 
	   11 
consumers and corporate investors -- could reclaim the City’s hydrological -- and 
urban -- commons from the swarming mass of illegitimate slum dwellers, Mumbai 
might attain civil order, a high quality of life for elites and the middle classes, and its 
aspiration, solidified in 2003 with the ‘Bombay First’ and ‘Vision Mumbai’ strategies 
for the City, to emerge as a truly ‘global city’ to compete with the likes of Singapore 
and Shanghai.  
 
These polices powerfully reinforce the message that slum-dwellers are not actually 
of Bombay; that their presence acts as a pathology and an obstacle to the legitimate 
aspirations of Mumbai’s elites. Thus, no political effort is made to address the root 
causes of these proscribed behaviours. Crucially, for example, no adequate 
alternative, public or formal water supplies are made available for the communities 
whose water supplies are destroyed in the raids. Thus acute water shortages, and 
extreme reliance of already vulnerable communities on the water mafia, are further 
accentuated. 
 
Powerful residents groups representing affluent areas have been especially vocal 
about the need to destroy the ‘illegal’ taps and the complicity of local municipal and 
water officials in the ‘water mafia’ operations that construct them at huge profit. The 
New Link Road Residents’ Forum, for example, which represents affluent 
communities in an area of Mumbai’s North Western suburbs (Figure 2), mentions 
these efforts to provide basic hydration in the same breath as what they term “terror 
threats to Mumbai’s water network.”18 Criticising “a huge slum by the name of 
Ganpat Patil Nagar” which has been built recently on the New Link Road, the group 
has filed many legal complaints about thefts to the mains water that preciously 
flowed unencumbered to their communities. The group “have been consistently filing 
complaints of alleged water theft by the slumlords and unsocial elements who 
indulge in puncturing the MCGM [Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai] lines 
laid under the link road.” The result of the “water theft,” they argue, “is being faced by 
the honest tax paying citizen of Borivali and Dahisar who often face water cuts and 
shortages and inconsistent supplies.” 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Geeta Desai, ‘Where does Mumbai’s water go?’ New Link Road Residents Forum, March 
26, 2010, at http://newlinkroad.blogspot.com/2010/03/where-does-mumbais-water-go.html 
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Fuelled by such allegations of ineffectiveness, corruption or complicity, the BMC 
have recently joined forces with the police to launch draconian raids against slum 
settlements during which improvised water pumps, tapping into the city’s formal 
water system, have been destroyed (the results have been the startling press 
conferences discussed at the start of this essay) and supposedly illegal pipes have 
been disconnected (Figure 3)19. Certain slum settlements, portrayed as especially 
venal centres of ‘water mafia’ activity and especially flagrant sites of theft, have been 
the particular focus of these activities. Raids in January, 2010, against the Dahisar 
slums identified by the New Link Road Residents, for example, were portrayed 
heroically in the Mumbai Mirror as being part of a ‘save water’ drive which 
successfully saved the city 400,000 litres of water.20 Harish Pandey, secretary of the 
New Link Road Residents’ Forum, was “thankful that the BMC has finally taken 
some action against this water theft.” He argued, however, that “the civic body 
should look at a permanent solution as slums end up getting water in full pressure, 
while taps at the taxpayers’ home run dry.”  
 
The most notorious slum for municipal raids, however, has been the largely Muslim 
settlement of Shivaji Nagar in Govandi in Mumbai’s M-East ward, the poorest of 
Mumbai’s 24 municipal wards (and a ward which has gradually become a 
concentration of poverty as people have been resettled here over thirty years of 
continuous slum clearance in central Mumbai). Here the BMC deems the destruction 
to be so “successful” as to consider it a model or exemplar to be followed around 
Mumbai’s other informal settlements. After one raid in Shivaji Nagar in early 
December, 2009, Senior Police Inspector Dundapa Jodgujari reported that his forces 
raided and destroyed 156 illegal water pipes which had been connected to the mains 
illegally. The police also seized 96 booster pumps. In the process they “detained 
around 40 people. Of these, 21 were arrested, as they did not have valid documents 
to use the pumps. Many of those arrested sold water to the slum dwellers.”21 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 This process links to the ways in which particular civic groups have become part of a 
broader architecture of exclusion in Mumbai. See, for example, Jonathan Shapiro Anjaria’s 
study of exclusive Advanced Locality Management (ALM) and Local Area Citizens’ Groups 
(LACG), ‘Guardians of the Bourgeois City: Citizenship, Public Space, and Middle-Class 
Activism in Mumbai’, City and Community, 8:4, pp. 391-406.	  
20 Virat A. Singh, ‘How the BMC saved…’ op. cit. 
21 Vinay Dalvi, ‘BMC, police begin crackdown on illegal water vendors,’ Mumbai Mirror, 
December 1st, 2009, p. 2. 
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Jodgujari, moreover, argued that local residents were profoundly relieved that the 
‘menace’ of the ‘water mafia’ was no longer hanging over their community. The 
Shivaji Nagar experience was deemed to be so successful by Rahul Shewale, 
standing committee chairman in BMC, that they began to consider implementing 
similar programmers of continuous raids across the whole of Mumbai.22  
 
 
Figure 3. Water pipes cut in Rafinagar during the water raids in December 2009 
(Photograph by Renu Desai) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Geeta Desai, ‘BMC wants ACB, cops to curb water thefts,’ Mumbai Mirror, June 7th, 2010, 
p. 4. 
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Our research in Rafinagar, an informal settlement located at the edge of Shivaji 
Nagar (Figure 2), suggests that water raids by the BMC have been a regular 
occurrence in some informal settlements. Almost every year, the BMC has cut some 
“illegal” water pipes supplying water to Rafinagar’s residents. However, this time 
around, these raids were not only carried out at a larger scale, with more intensity, 
but also for the first time involved the police. The water wars in Mumbai then have 
evolved from routinised practices of BMC crackdown on “illegal” connections to 
militarized crackdowns. Initially, basic criminal law surrounding damage to public 
property or inhibiting public services was used to prosecute those deemed to be 
guilty of setting up illegal water connections. The discourse of ‘water emergency,’ 
however, soon allowed political leaders to also invoke the much more draconian 
Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA)23 against offenders. Not only 
were arrests made under these laws, but the militarized crackdown also translated 
into police harassment on the streets of ordinary residents trying to now obtain water 
from surrounding areas by foot or cycle. There is a sense amongst NGOs working in 
Shivaji Nagar, whose population is 70% Muslim and increasingly comprises of north-
Indian migrants (both Hindu and Muslim), that the water raids in the area are 
reflective of the religious and ethnic biases of municipal officials and the police.24 
The vehement anti-Muslim and anti-north Indian politics of the Shiv Sena, which has 
penetrated the work cultures of the municipal government and the police, thus also 
shapes how the broader revanchist politics against Mumbai’s poor unfolds on the 
ground.  
 
Beyond the use of draconian laws, further efforts to securitise Mumbai’s water 
system are becoming evident. The Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation has drawn 
up plans to physically demolish and erase some of the most recent encroaching 
informal settlements. 25  This is part of an extremely controversial slum demolition 
and resettlement programme, which was launched by the Hindu nativist Shiv Sena 
party when it was in power in the State of Maharashtra in the mid-1990s and which 
continues to be implemented under the current Congress Party in power.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Sudhir Suryawanshi, ‘Water thieves to be tried under MCOCA,’ Mumbai Mirror, April 10th, 
2010, p. 2. 
24 Personal interviews with Leena Joshi, Apnalaya (a community-development NGO). 
25 Sudhir Suryawanshi, “BMC to reclaim city’s pipelines,” Mumbai Mirror, September 11th, 
2009, p. 2. 
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Ambitious, although still unimplemented, plans were also announced in late 2009 to 
place protective walls around every major exposed water main in the City, supported 
by a complex network of closed circuit television cameras and security guards. One 
BMC official revealed: “We will float a tender for construction of a protective wall. At 
some places where this is difficult, we will put up a barbed wire. We have even 
planned to deploy security guards to keep a vigil and protect the pipelines, as we 
have received terrorist threats stating that the pipelines could be blown up. Besides, 
there is the peril of someone poisoning the city’s water supply through the pipelines. 
We will take all possible measures in due time to prevent a disaster.”26 The CCTV 
system, costing Rs. 2.3 m  (around $50,000 US), was put out to tender in April 
2010.27 
 
Hydrological Apartheid 
 
Crucially, at no point does Mumbai’s water revanchism in Mumbai allow the provision 
of adequate alternative sources of formal, public or ‘legal’ water supplies to the 
majority of the City’s population living in slums. What such discourses and actions 
mask is the inevitability of mass water theft amongst Zopadpatti dwellers in Mumbai 
in a context where political elites have long worked to use the systematic 
dehydration of such places as a deliberate strategy to discourage the formation, or 
force abandonment, of slums. Since 1996, the Maharashtra State Government – first 
under the Hindu nativist Shiv Sena and then under the Congress Party – has 
deliberately linked the right to water to the geography of tenancy in Mumbai. Slums 
deemed to have been formed after January 1st, 1995 are considered unrecognized 
and have, consequently, been totally denied rights to access formal water mains.  
Official, recognized slums are entitled to water connections on provision of a photo-
pass, name on the voters’ list or ration card with the requisite pre-1995 date. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Sudhir Suryawanshi, “BMC to reclaim city’s pipelines,” Mumbai Mirror, September 11, 
2009, p. 2. 
27 Sharad Vyas, “BMC kickstarts process to instal CCTVs at pipelines,” The Times of India, 
Mumbai edition, April 6, 2010, p. 5. 
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However, these comprise of metered group connections, shared between 5-15 
households, which are supposed to provide 45 litres per person per day (as opposed 
to 135 litres per person per day in residences in the formal city). Moreover, these 
connections don’t always materialize and when they do, they don’t always provide 
adequate water. The 1.2 million or more people living in post-1995 settlements,28 
meanwhile, remain unrecognized and consequently live under the permanent threat 
of the bulldozer and bereft of legal entitlements to water.  
Of course this ruling has done nothing to inhibit the continued growth and formation 
of slums, as India’s population burgeons and ever-more migrants move to Mumbai 
from impoverished and violent rural states in search of a better life. Indeed, in the 
absence of affordable housing in the formal city, many slums are brought into being 
through corrupt public officials working in liaison with elements of the land mafia, the 
‘slumlords,’ and the ‘vote-bank’ politics whereby politicians seek to gain the votes of 
the city’s majority slum dwellers in exchange for electoral promises.   
In such a context, the demands amongst slum dwellers for even minimal hydration 
have provided the motivation for the growth of the complex world of the so-called 
‘water mafia.’ Both pipeline connections and tanker supplies are accelerated and 
made possible through large payments organised through middlemen, in connivance 
with local municipal ward officials and hydraulic department officials, politicians, and 
police officers. Our research in Rafinagar revealed that most residents pay between 
Rs.5-20 for a 35-litre jerry-can of water. This is between 30 and 200 times more than 
the official  municipal water tariff for slums. In Rafinagar, obtaining a legal water 
connection from the BMC usually involves having to resort to a middleman and 
residents have to pay between Rs. 20,000-60,000 to organise a legal water 
connection from the public mains. Not all residents, therefore, can afford to get a 
legal connection and are forced to be dependent on those who can incur such costs. 
The middleman, who is sometimes a plumber, organizes the installation of the water 
pipe, giving a cut to local corporators, hydraulic department officials and the police. 
Even after this, there is no guarantee of how long water will come in the pipe. 
Nonetheless, having incurred these high expenses, these “tap-owner” residents then 
sell water at high prices to others in their neighbourhood, in order to recover their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Sukhada Tatke, ‘Slumdwellers rely on ration shops for water,’ Times of India, December 
19th, 2010, p. 9. 
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investment, pay the BMC’s water bill, as well as make some cash for themselves. 
Along with such formal connections are ‘illegal’ connections organized by middlemen 
for some residents, who similarly sell water at prices that rise and fall with the 
seasons and the extremities of the water crises. The geography of legality and 
illegality becomes difficult to unravel after a while, but it is clear that it is the result of 
mafia-style arrangements involving middlemen, municipal officials, politicians and the 
police. Thus, during the raids in Rafinagar, many legal connections were also cut by 
the BMC. Meanwhile, the raids created a deeper water crisis for those who had been 
forced to depend on these legal/illegal connections for water, and they increasingly 
had to pay more money to obtain water from inside Rafinagar or had to now go to 
neighbouring areas on foot or cycle to obtain water.  
Mumbai’s water tanker mafia is also well understood. An investigation by the 
Mumbai Mirror in April, 2010, for example, showed how 6,500 rupees delivered to 
hydraulic department and ward officials, ostensibly to film a ‘rain scene’ in a 
Bollywood movie, was able to bring instant water tanker deliveries, filled illegally from 
the public water system by one of the 10,000 or so private water tankers in Mumbai. 
(Through official BMC means, such tankers take at least a week to arrive, cost only 
Rs. 600, and come through the BMC’s over-stretched fleet of only 24 water 
tankers.)29 The newspaper’s investigations revealed a classic racket which forced 
slum dwellers – and, indeed, more affluent communities who often resort to private 
tankers as well -- to pay extremely high prices to the water mafia for water – prices 
which rise and fall with the levels of supply and the depth of the city’s water crisis. 
The water mafia system is organised by geographic neighbourhood, with kickbacks 
distributed to key political, municipal and hydraulic department officials to keep 
everyone happy.  
In such a context it is no surprise that City officials attempting to stop the water mafia 
surrounding pipeline or tanker provision have struggled to cope with the complex 
vested interests involved. And by destroying pipes built illegally in slum settlements, 
BMC official were, of course, further adding to levels of demand for highly profitable 
tanker supplies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Anil Raina, “Water, yes, but at 10 times the cost,” Mumbai Mirror, November 12, 2009. 
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At the broader scale, and to compound the geographies of hydrological apartheid 
across Mumbai, the BMC has presided over the construction of a whole archipelago 
of massive water-hungry architectural edifices. These are geared towards the 
Mumbai’s powerful middle class and social and political elites and endlessly invoked 
as evidence that Mumbai is ‘going global.’  Most obvious here has been the 
complicity of the BMC in licensing the proliferation of private swimming pools within 
Mumbai’s burgeoning array of upscale gated communities and apartment 
complexes.30 But large-scale water theme parks are also being built across the City’s 
suburbs. As ordinary Mumbaikers reeled under the 10% supply cuts during the 2003 
water crisis, Charubala Annuncio  observed that, at the same time, the periphery of  
Mumbai was being ringed by complexes of water parks, theme parks, leisure parts,  
elite high-rise complexes, clubs, and bungalows with swimming pools rented out for 
Bollywood film shootings. “Just the two dozen existing water parks in Mumbai and 
adjoining areas like Thane and Raigad use over 50 billion litres of water every day. 
Of this, Esselworld's Water Kingdom, which is spread over 24 acres, gets over 7 
billion litres.”31 Indeed, together, the water parks received twice the water supply of 
the whole on Mumbai.  
India’s burgeoning bottled water industry only adds to sense of the country’s 
deepening hydrological apartheid.  As elsewhere, in Mumbai those who can afford it 
increasingly buy bottled water to try and insulate themselves from the perceived 
health risks of piped municipal water, which has often been found to be 
contaminated. Such strategies reflect a broader tendency amongst more affluent 
Mumbaikers to attempt to secede from the public city through gated communities, 
new raised highways, private malls and the ‘capsular’ mobilities afforded by private 
cars.   
The Indian market for bottled water, valued at Rs. 10 billion in 2010, is growing at an 
astonishing 40% per annum.32 The industry, which tripled in size between 1999 and 
2004, is one of India’s fastest growing. Over two hundred brands jostle for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Varun Singh, “Pools to be built despite water crunch,” Mid.Day.Com, April, 2010, 2nd April, 
at http://www.mid-day.com/news/2010/apr/020410-swimming-pools-water-crunch-
mumbai.htm 
31  Charubala Annuncio, ‘Watery divisions,’ Outlook India.Com, May 26th, 2003, at 
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?220265 
32 Gits4u.com, ‘Bottled water industry in India,’ 2010 at 
http://www.gits4u.com/water/water16.htm 
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market, their utopian advertising looming large above the City’s streets (see Figure 
4). For those who can but-in, the latest ‘premium’ bottled brands offer the fantasy of 
a pure, ‘natural’, escapism amidst the hyper-urbanisation of Mumbai. “I was born in 
the Shivalik range of the Himalayas,” proclaims the label on the Tata corporation’s 
‘Himalayan’ bottled water. “In a place most of you visit only in an Atlas. In a time that 
wasn’t measured by cuckoos that sprang out of clocks. In a silence that was 
sometimes punctuated by howling winds and gushing streams. In a world that had 
northing to do with yours.” This mythologised ‘journey’ of Mumbai’s premium, elite, 
bottled water, a Tata press release argues, “seeks to make the consumer one with 
its source — the Himalayas — with its inherent and pristine goodness that sets it 
apart from ordinary water.”33 The strap-line seems especially startling given the 
wider context of Mumbai’s water wars: “Hydration with wellness.” 
The larger, corporate bottling plants, which are owned by companies such as Parle 
Bisleri, Nestle, Coca Cola, PepsiCo, Manikchand, and Britannia, and are given water 
at favourably low charges, are based on the urban fringes. Simpreet Singh of the 
National Alliance of People's Movement points out that, even during water cut-offs 
and no water days for the rest of Mumbai, the BMC continues to supply over 800,000 
litres a day of potable water to bottling plants – for mineral water and soft drinks – 
geared towards the city’s middle classes and elites.34 Indeed, despite the city’s 
deepening water crisis, and the extreme scarcities suffered by informal cities, the 
BMC has supplied almost 300 million litres of water to 17 bottling plants in 13 months 
between January 2009 and February 10, 2010.35 The largest of these, Duke and 
Sons, owned by Pepsi, used almost 80 million litres in the same period.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Tata Group, ‘Mount Everest Mineral Water unveils the new Himalayan natural mineral 
water,’ May 7th, 2008 at 
http://www.tata.com/media/releases/inside.aspx?artid=Mw/mP8IlwTE= 
34 Sukhada Tatke, ‘Slumdwellers rely on…’ op. cit. 
35 Alka Shukla, ‘Bottled up,’ Mumbai Mirror, April 14th, 2010, p. 8. 
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Figure 4. A Bisleri bottled water advert looms large over Mumbai, North of the Fort 
District (Photograph by Colin McFarlane) 
 
While the middle-classes and elites tackle the water crisis by a combination of 
groundwater from their bore-wells, calling in private water tankers, and more 
recently by installing rainwater harvesting and grey-water recycling systems, 
thus seceding from the public city when required, the urban poor spiral into 
further depths of water crisis.  
 
“Can Shanghai be made on the graves of the poor?” 
Mumbai’s water raids have drastically accentuated the public health, economic and 
social impacts of systematic dehydration amongst already vulnerable communities. 
Paradoxically, the reliance of such communities on extremely expensive water 
organized through water tanker mafia and, ironically, further ‘illegal’ piped supplies 
delivered through BMC corruption, has also been deepened still further.  
The limited evidence available already paints a bleak picture of the health and social 
impacts of systematic water shortages amongst Mumbai’s slum dwellers. Even 
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before the raids, a study of four slums in the year 2000,36 for example, showed that 
even where one water tap was provided between 13-30 households, it was woefully 
inadequate both qualitatively and in terms of quality. The median per capita daily 
water consumption per person in the four slums was found to be as little as 26, 27, 
33 and 25 litres per day. Not surprisingly, slum-dwellers always ranked access to 
water and toilet facilities as being the most important issues they faced. Amongst 
slum-dwellers living with such extreme water scarcity, the annual diarrhoea, typhoid 
and malaria cases were estimated to be 614, 68 and 126 per thousand people 
respectively. The study found that “all types of water-borne disease are occurring 
with great severity” in all the four poor communities that were studied. Consequently, 
the authors calculated that at least 30% of all deaths in Mumbai’s could be 
accounted for by water-related infections.  
Dr. Ravindra Rathod,37 of the Niramaya Health Foundation in Rafinagar, recounted 
to us some of the chronic health impacts from systematic dehydration that he has to 
treat daily amongst his patients. Diarrhoea, dysentery, scabies and typhoid are all 
extremely common. As desperation takes hold, many people dig their own 
boreholes, accessing limited supplies of extremely contaminated ground water in the 
process. Throughout the Govandi district, rates of diarrhoea, cholera, hepatitis and, 
most disturbing of all, polio, are rocketing as result of such desperate measures.38 
Nazia Sayed and Geeta Desai point out that, to date, the Indian state has spent Rs. 
26 billion trying to eradicate polio, only to have it return as all too predictable by-
product of the aggressive water raids policy. Sangeeta Yadav, a Mankhurd resident, 
discussed a newly dug well in her house with the journalists. “How do they expect us 
to survive without water?” she asked.  “We have no option but to drink this dirty 
water. We will die if we don’t drink water, and we will die if we drink this water. 
Whatever has to happen, will happen.”39 Iqbal Shaikh, a social worker in the area 
lobbying for more municipal pipelines, stressed that “the residents all know the water 
is contaminated but are helpless. For days we don’t get water in the area and if we 
complain the BMC people demand a huge amount of money for a pipeline. That’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Sunil Kumar, Shigeo Shikura and Hideki Harada, ‘Living environment…’ op. cit. 
37 Personal interview on Feb 6, 2010. 
38 Nazia Sayed and Geeta Desai, ‘Thirst for water leading to polio,’ Mumbai Mirror, 
December 29th, 2009, p. 1. 
39 ibid.  
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the reason why people opt for such illegal measures.” 
 
Following the destruction of pipes serving Rafinagar in November, 2009, for 
example, our research has documented in detail how the community was pushed 
more deeply into a water crisis. Two weeks after the raids, the BMC did install two 
temporary water storage tanks just outside Rafinagar. However, beyond the burden 
of long hours queuing, even this completely inadequate supply was next to useless 
for most residents as the arrival of the BMC water tankers to fill the tanks was 
extremely sporadic. In addition, many physical struggles occurred as residents 
fought over the inadequate water supplies, especially when the tankers finally arrived 
(Figure 5). “Either beat up each other for water or die [without water] yourself,” a 
Rafinagar woman remarked to us caustically.40 “Those whose mouths have strength 
[to speak up/shout],” recounted another,  “those whose bodies are strong, those who 
can curse, they are the ones who can fill [water from the tanks].”41  
The extreme water scarcity in Rafinagar meant that, for the first time, private water 
tankers, organized through organized corruption and offering extremely expensive 
water to those who could afford it, began to be regularly called in. Many of the 
private water tankers also obtained water from bore-wells, pointing to profits being 
made through excessive and unregulated groundwater extraction.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Resident, Rafinagar Part-2, personal interview, Jan 8th, 2010. 
41 Resident, Rafinagar Part-1, personal interview, Jan 12th 2010. 
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Figure 5: Rafinagar residents waiting at one of the temporary water storage tanks for 
the BMC water tanker to come and fill it (photo by Renu Desai)  
 
Water prices within Rafinagar quickly doubled after the raids.  Whilst an official BMC 
water supply to a slum would be charged at Rs.2.25 for 1000 litres, Rafinagar 
residents, the poorest of Mumbai’s poor, were now paying up to three times that 
amount just to fill one water jerry-can of 35-40 litres. Some of our interviewees thus 
ended up spending over 600 Rs. per month on minimal water supplies, out of a total 
monthly income of Rs. 3000-4000. 
After the raids, many more of Rafinagar‘s residents than before were forced to rely 
on sources of water outside, accessing these  by time-consuming and exhausting 
and extremely time consuming 1-5 km journeys by foot or cycle. Many women and 
young girls, in particular, went by foot with water pots to search for water from 
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outside while many men and boys went by cycle with water jerry-cans. Children had 
to forego schooling or paid work because of the imperative of accessing water. 
These itinerant water-carriers, in turn, then became prone to state violence and 
harassment. The BMC and police started to confiscate cycles and water-cans and 
puncturing water-cans. An additional problem was that the threats of arrest against 
those caught ‘illegally’ selling water to Rafinagar residents meant that water-carriers 
found it harder and harder to gain even expensive supplies beyond the community’s 
boundaries. For instance, one male resident (who used to often fill water from 
outside Rafinagar even before the water raids) told us: “People in Shivaji Nagar 
aren’t giving water. They say that if we give you water then the police will catch us.”42  
The systematic state harassment, and the active denial of an essential source of 
urban life, has led to deep feelings of outrage and alienation amongst Rafinagar and 
Govandi inhabitants. “I sold my jewellery to acquire this connection and now police 
have seized the motor. How can we live without water?” pleaded one Govandi 
woman who has a family of six to the Mumbai Mirror’s Nazia Sayed.43 Many 
complained that they weren't even aware that their connections, organized after all 
with BMC complicity, were technically illegal. Others were incensed that raids 
destroyed pipes that were legally supplied and for which they had been paying bills. 
A further group of residents actually backed the raids because the resulting 
increases in pressure further down the pipes meant that their supplies were 
improved.  
Govind, a 17 years old, visibly upset as he recounted his experience, discussed with 
us how, as a Rafinagar resident, he was violently assaulted by residents in 
neighbouring Gautamnagar, “Once when I was coming back from there, some 5-6 
men from there stopped me on my cycle and they forcefully took the cans and upset 
all the water. They told me that if you people from Rafinagar come here to fill water 
then Gautamnagar’s connections will also be cut so don’t come here again.” 
Mumbai’s slum-dwellers are painfully aware of the way in which their demonization 
has served the purposes of the City’s political and economic elites. They are also not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Resident, Rafinagar Part-1, personal interview, March 7, 2010. 
43 Nazia Sayed, ‘Artificial water shortage in Govandi’, Mumbai Mirror, December 05, 2009, p. 
6. 
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slow to see direct causal links between the wider political aspirations of 
reengineering Mumbai into a “global city” or a “new Shanghai”, and the increasingly 
orchestrated state violence against them and their needs.  
Salma, one our Rafinagar interviewees,44 and discussing the ongoing threats of 
demolition against the settlement, as well as the water raids, puts it more bluntly 
“The government is not listening to us,” she says, “because it wants to make 
[Mumbai into] Shanghai […]. We don’t oppose Shanghai. But [the government] 
comes and crushes us and goes away, like [one might crush] ants… We would also 
like that Shanghai is made. We might not see it but at least our children will. Our 
children’s dreams will be fulfilled!” But, Salma argues, if Mumbai’s Government and 
ruling elites “try to make Shanghai at the cost of the dreams and aspirations of the 
poor then this Shanghai will not be successful… Can Shanghai be made on the 
graves of the poor? If there is a funeral opposite me and I play music, can I really 
enjoy it?”  
The final target of recent water protests in Mumbai were have been major political 
parties’ vote-bank politics which traditionally surround the politics of water provision 
for Mumbai’s poor.  Through these, election-cycles tend to coincide with lavish 
policies to address the desperate water crises afflicting Mumbai’s slums, but these 
promises are quickly forgotten after elections are over, and politicians come to power 
(whether at ward level, city level, or state level).  These politics are increasingly 
predatory, however, as they also exploit the almost complete dependence of slum-
dwellers on the corrupt practices of elected officials to instigate the ‘illegal’ piped or 
tanker supplies that are targeted in the raids. 
 
The Right to Urban Water 
In Mumbai, water ‘infrastructure’ encompasses much more than pipes, aquifers, 
rivers, boreholes and taps. It also involves, crucially, complex social and political 
arrangements and the very people of the City.45 The myriad of ways of accessing 
water in Mumbai force us to understand that the urbanization of water is far from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Resident, Rafinagar Part-2, personal interview, Jan 8th, 2010 
45 See Abdou Maliq Simone, ‘People as infrastructure: Intersecting fragments in 
Johannesburg,’ Public Culture, 13(3), 407-408, 2004. 
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being some clean, modernist, or orderly ‘technical’ process whereby urban life 
becomes hydrated from afar. Rather, it is complex, messy and utterly infused with 
political, social and legal struggles over the rights to urban life.  
In Mumbai, the weakness of civil society, and the absence of concepts of universal 
citizenship, have paved the way for a systematic water revanchism: an attempt by 
the middle-classes to ‘claim back’ the City’s hydrological commons from the poor 
through a discourse that casts them as tax-paying citizens who are denied their 
legitimate right to municipal water because this is diverted through vote-bank politics 
and corruption to “encroaching” slum dwellers who have no legitimate right to the 
city’s resources. This discourse erases the experiences of the urban poor of the 
hydrological apartheid as it does their right to urban water. This discourse further 
dovetails with attempts by powerful elites to ‘claim back’ the City from the poor 
majority under the spurious justification of competing with mythological cities 
elsewhere (Shanghai, Singapore…).   
Mumbai’s water wars reveal in stark detail what emerges when slum-dwellers are 
cast out from the rights of a modern urban existence in the world’s burgeoning 
mega-cities. Excavating them shows in startling detail how the complete denial of the 
status of water as a public good to be organised and distributed collectively to benefit 
all urban residents opens to door to the hydrological apartheid which surrounds the 
hyper-commodification of the ultimate inelastic good. Finally, our story demonstrates 
forcibly how easily apparently benign aspirations to ‘Clean up’ global south 
megacities, to allow them to be reengineered into ‘global’ metropolises imitating 
some shining and mythical exemplar (so often Shanghai but, increasingly, Dubai) 
can camouflage extreme campaigns of violence, erasure, intimidation and plunder by 
political and economic elites  against the vulnerable and poor.  
The water wars’ results – dehydration, death, disease and desperation – 
demonstrate the urgent need to challenge the politics of water war at its very political 
foundation. For, only by building a politics of water rights, addressing the legitimate 
needs of Mumbai’s poor for clean, adequate water, will the City and State authorities 
ever hope to eradicate the symptoms of poverty and social fragmentation that their 
regressive and violent mobilisations are ostensibly designed to address. We are 
encouraged by the range of activist groups and organizations that attempt to draw 
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attention to Mumbai’s deeply unequal urban metabolism, but we have yet to see a 
broader movement in the city coalesce around water and sanitation that continually 
calls into question and offers robust alternatives to the nature of the city’s 
development strategies.  
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